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A Whole Text Reading of the War Powers Clauses:
Why the Constitution’s Text Obviates Esoteric War
Powers Debates and Encourages Policy Flexibility
and Democratic Accountability
ANTONIO F. PEREZ*
The question this panel was asked to debate is whether the President had “the
power to use force in Syria without Congressional approval.” But power is one
thing and authority is another. The president may have the “power,” a usurpa-
tion of which would be punishable through impeachment for “high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.”1 Stated this way, the gravity of the question becomes clear, and
prudence commands a close review of the potential grounds for concluding the
President—had he gone forward with the course of action he threatened in the
event President Assad crossed the President’s “Red Line” and used chemical
weapons against his own people—would have been liable to impeachment. I
don’t think so, as a close review of our Constitution’s text and structure should
make clear. Indeed, a close review of the whole text makes the President’s
authority to threaten or use force rather clear, establishing a default position that
the President can act in the absence of express limitations imposed by Congress
under the powers available to him. So the ground I would take to answer the
question makes it a rather easy call.
Textualists have long debated the original meaning of the “Declare War”
Clause,2 primarily focusing on the original understanding of the text in light of
the technical understanding of lawyers (including international lawyers), then
resorting to related language in the Constitutional text, followed by history from
the drafting convention and the ratification history of the states.3 These textual-
* Professor of Law, The Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America; A.B.,
Harvard University; J.D., Columbia Law School. This paper is a lightly-footnoted and modestly
expanded version of my presentation at the Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy Symposium’s
panel on Executive War Powers, Syria, and President Obama’s “Red Line”—Did President Obama
Have the Power to Use Force in Syria without Congressional Approval? Many thanks go to the editors
of the Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy for a splendid symposium and to Professor Wallace,
one of my interlocutors in this debate. A friendly disagreement is a happy experience: good for the soul,
and one we ought to model more frequently. Indeed, our disagreement is quite narrow. Both of us
would respect the text, rather than allow history of some variant of living constitutionalism to change
our Constitution. We simply disagree about what that the text means. But I would take the view that
neither of us suffers from the need to carry a burden of persuasion, particularly when that burden is
based on historically-grounded assumptions. It’s the best reading of the text that should prevail.
© 2014, Antonio F. Perez.
1. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 4.
2. Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
3. Compare John Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of
War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167 (1996) [The Original Understanding]; and War and the Constitutional
Text, 69 CHI. L. REV. 1639 (2002) [Constitutional Text] (advancing the pro-executive view); with
Michael Ramsey, Textualism and War Power, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1543 (2002) [Textualism], and Text
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ist debates turn ultimately on the precise meaning of the word “declare”—with
the pro-executive position judging that it means only a change in legal relations,
rather than an authorization to use force4; while the pro-congressional, textualist
position reads “declare” to mean an expression of intention manifest through
either a formal declaration or through the use of force itself, thus giving
Congress alone the power to authorize a use of force.5 These debates, it seems
to me, read the text initially from the “declare War” clause rather than starting
with the whole text in which the “declare War” clause is found. These textualist
methods thus make an easy question rather hard; starting with ambiguity in the
word “declare,” they resort to subsidiary methods of interpretation based on
guesses as to an esoteric original public meaning. Thus, the door is further
opened to reliance on precedential, historical reasoning when esoteric original
meaning is necessarily debatable—when plain language original public mean-
ing would be clear and beyond debate.
The whole text approach, in contrast, provides a clear and convincing explana-
tion. Indeed, the text, read as a whole, permits only one conclusion, obviating
resort to additional sources. Thus it would be unnecessary to debate technical
understandings of original public meaning that the “People” would never have
considered. Thus also it would be unnecessary to rely on subsequent history and
practice—such as the Office of Legal Counsel’s Libya Opinion’s recent parsing
of the meaning of precedents for unilateral Executive action,6 which has been
viewed as problematic even by those who accept in principal the use of history
and precedent.7
That said, it is possible that pragmatic or functional justifications could
matter; namely, that clear presidential authority serves the national security
interest in an Age of Terror and Weapons of Mass Destruction, when credible
threats of military action are necessary to deter adversaries, is a legal justifica-
tion for reading the text to give the president plenary authority to initiate, and
therefore threaten, the use of force. These pragmatic considerations could even
and History in the War Powers Debate: A Reply to Professor Yoo, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1685 (2002) [Text]
(advancing the pro-congressional view).
4. See Yoo, The Original Understanding, supra note 3, at 242–49 (describing the declaration as
performing a “judicial function”).
5. See Ramsey, Text, supra note 3, at 1590–96 (relying principally on Locke’s reference to “declara-
tion by word or action”); but see Yoo, Constitutional Text, supra note 3, at 1651–54 (arguing that the
context for this remark is Locke’s discussion of the pre-political state of nature rather than the
allocation of governmental war powers).
6. See Memorandum Opinion from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office
of Legal Counsel, to the Att’y Gen., Authority to Use Military Force in Libya (Apr. 1, 2011) [OLC
Libya Memorandum], available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2011/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf
(last visited June 9, 2014).
7. See Curtis Bradley and Trevor Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers,
126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 466 (2012) (“These precedents would seem to offer little if any support to the
OLC’s acquiescence-based claims in its Libya opinion”); and Michael J. Glennon, The Cost of
“Empty Words”: A Comment on the Justice Department’s Libya Opinions, HARV. NAT’L SEC. J.F. 1
(2011).
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reinforce a plain text interpretation to further the Constitution’s overarching
purpose of “providing for the common defense.”8 But functional arguments
alone, whose currency will vary over time, would, if taken seriously, require
amendment of the Constitution to override inconsistent textual requirements to
accord with modern politico-military realities. Moreover, pragmatic arguments
at the level of constitutional purpose risk encouraging resort in constitutional
analysis to elite knowledge of history and elite judgments of functional consider-
ations in national security decision-making, as well as functional arguments
that, however well-intentioned, merely mask attempts to assert as constitutional
entitlements the ordinary power-seeking political objective of institutions of
government, in this case the Congress. Rather, by enabling the President to act
and burdening Congress with responsibility for enacting constraining legisla-
tion, debate will shift, as it did in the case of Syria, towards the prudence and
morality of specific decisions, as judged by the People’s elected representatives
and ultimately, therefore, the People themselves.
But, before sketching out a view that begins with the plain meaning of the
whole text, let me explain why originalist modes of constitutional interpretation
based on esoteric knowledge serve only to complicate what should be a simple
question.
POTENTIAL LIMITS ON PRESIDENTIAL POWER
Esoteric knowledge, even for textualists, seems to have played an important
role in interpretation of the “declare War” clause. The usual suspect for limiting
the grant of Executive power to use force only to “repelling sudden attacks” on
the United States is the debate at the Constitutional Convention. But Madison’s
Notes, recording this debate, were not available to the public for at least a
generation, and certainly not during the ratification debates.9 Therefore, nothing
about this debate forms part of the common understanding of the Constitution,
which was proposed and ratified by “Conventions” of the States,10 not the State
legislatures, which purport to speak for “The People of the United States,”11 not
their intelligentsia. So this source of information cannot form part of the
original public meaning of the Constitution.
A second candidate offered for limiting Presidential power has been Original
Intent gleaned from the ratification process. This approach relies principally on
8. U.S. CONST., pmbl.
9. See HENRY GILPIN, THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON (1940), available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
The_Papers_of_James_Madison#cite_note-Gilpin-4.
10. See U.S. CONST., art. VII; see generally GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
(1969) (discussing the role of “Conventions” as direct expression of popular will). The text of Article
VII further makes clear that the Constitution itself was “done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent
of the States . . .” The language marries a claim of direct popular representation, “Convention,” in the
act of proposing a new Constitution with the “consent” of existing political authorities, the “States.”
11. See U.S. CONST., pmbl.
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a source of evidence that was before New Yorkers and some other states,12
although by no means a supermajority of the people of all the states—namely,
Alexander Hamilton’s essay in No. 69 of The Federalist Papers. Here, Hamil-
ton stated that the “Commander-in-Chief” Power of the President “would
amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the
military . . . while that of the British King extends to the declaring of war, and
to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies—all of which by the Constitu-
tion under consideration would appertain to the legislature.”13
But this language is not self-defining. It refers only to the Commander-in-
Chief Power, does not mention the Executive Power, leaves undefined the
meaning of “supreme command and direction,” and does not explain what it
means to “appertain to the legislature.” Hamilton’s failure to refer explicitly to
the Executive Power plainly leaves the door open to an argument based on the
implications of Article II’s cession to the President of all “the Executive Power”
of the United States, as compared to Article I’s cession of only the legislative
powers “herein granted” to the Congress.14 Hamilton himself made good use of
this textual difference in the first major constitutional controversy concerning
foreign relations law to argue that President Washington, possessing fully the
external powers of the United States, had plenary authority to construe the
Treaty of Alliance with France so as not to impair his authority to proclaim U.S.
neutrality in the war between Britain and France.15 Moreover, originalists
prepared to resort immediately to the esoteric knowledge of the elite members
of a founding generation might look to political theorist John Locke’s definition
of the Executive Power to include the so-called “federative” (or foreign rela-
tions power), which in turn included the power to use force.16 Hamilton’s
silence in The Federalist Papers as to the Executive Power left open precisely
the argument he later made in the Neutrality Debate. But one does not need to
explore this elite-centered argument if one can see that Hamilton’s essay in The
Federalist Papers, properly construed, simply parses the text to note the truism
that the Congressional powers enumerated in Article I of “declaring war” and
“raising” and “regulating” the armed forces, as legislative powers, are beyond
12. John Yoo also draws attention to the failure of proponents of the Constitution to defend it
against charges of facilitating domestic tyranny through unchecked war powers, not on the basis of
Congress’s power to “Declare War” but rather on Congress’s power to restrict appropriations. See Yoo,
Original Understanding, supra note 3, at 279–86 (especially in the critical Virginia ratifying con-
vention debate). But there is no reason to believe use of negative pregnant reasoning in one state
debate, or even several, could reflect a common understanding of the “People” in the same way that the
Federalist Papers could have informed nation-wide debate on the wisdom and meaning of the proposed
Constitution.
13. See THE FEDERALIST, No. 69, 418 (Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis in the original).
14. Compare U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1, cl. 1 with Article I, § 8.
15. See Alexander Hamilton, PACIFICUS, No. 1, reprinted in BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 14–15 (3rd ed. 2009).
16. See Yoo, Original Understanding, supra note 3, at 199–200 (citing and discussing John Locke,
THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, paras. 143–45 (J.W. Gough ed., 3d ed. 1966)).
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the residuum of non-legislative powers contained in the Executive Power and
the Commander-in-Chief Power.17
THE TEXT READ AS A WHOLE
It has been suggested that the whole text of the Constitution supports the
view that Congress’s power to “declare War” necessarily does not refer to the
power to use force. The argument that the “declare War” clause does not refer to
the use of force has turned on the special meaning of the word “declare”
according to international law publicists, and it has also turned on evidence in
the Constitution in other contexts concerning the use of the term “waging” or
“levying” war. Therefore, it is argued, failure to do so in the “declare War”
clause necessarily implies a meaning other than authorization to use force, or
“engage in” or “levy” war.18 While this argument has some force, it seems to be
advanced only to refute alternative interpretations of the meaning of “declare.”
Moreover, it reasons from the use of the term “war” in other constitutional
contexts—federalism and individual rights—that provide only strained analo-
gies to the context in which the “declare War” power is found. It is better to
focus on that narrower context, the set of clauses that immediately surround the
“declare War” clause, to locate its meaning.
But it is unnecessary to explore the original public meaning of the Constitu-
tion on this question, since the plain text fully establishes this President’s
plenary power to use force. Commentators have noted that the “declare War”
phrase is immediately followed by powers to “grant Letters of Marque and
Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and War.”19 “Letters of
17. When the Congress plays a role in Executive functions, such as the Senate’s role in treaty-
making or appointment of executive officers, it specifies Congress’s role in Article II rather than
Article I. See U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2. Viewing the Treaty Power as essentially federative or executive,
rather than legislative, makes clear why Article VI must further specify that treaties are also “supreme
Law of the Land.” U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2. Similarly, when the President performs acts that may have
immediate legislative effects, the Constitution explicitly provides the President with that authority.
Indeed, it is for this reason that the President is expressly granted the power to “receive Ambassadors
and other public Ministers.” U.S. CONST., art. 2, § 3. Otherwise, the Executive Power, which does not
ordinarily include the power to create a domestic legal right or duty would not provide the basis for
Presidential action to respect the diplomatic and consular immunities against otherwise applicable
federal or state law.
18. See Yoo, Constitutional Text, supra note 3, at 1670 (discussing Article I, Section 10’s use
of “engage in War” and Article III’s use of “levying War”). With respect to Article I, Section 10’s
prohibition on the States’ “engaging in War, unless actually invaded or in such imminent Danger
as will not admit of delay,” Yoo explicitly makes clear that he is drawing on arguments constructed to
defend the treaty interchangeability doctrine. See id., at 1668, n.79 (citing Myres S. McDougal and
Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instru-
ments of National Policy: I, 54 YALE L. J. 181, 205 (1945)). But that argument addresses the
requirement of a Senate super-majority as a substitution for House participation in federal law-making,
not Congressional participation in the Executive Power. And it seems clear that reference to “levying
War” supplies a conduct element that would be necessary to define the crime of treason. U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 3.
19. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
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Marque and Reprisal” were authorizations for U.S. private parties, thus engag-
ing in privateering, to engage lawfully in acts that otherwise would be consid-
ered piratical activity against the citizens or vessels of other nations,20 a practice
subsequently abolished under international law beginning with the Declaration
of Paris of 1856 following the Crimean War.21
But the powers that preface these powers are what make clear that the
“declare War” power and the subsequently enumerated powers are legislative;
they are necessary to facilitate the adjudication of individual rights under
international and municipal law relating to war. The immediately preceding
clause enabling Congress to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies commit-
ted on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations,”22 supplies the
context for the meaning of the “declare War” power, the “Letter of Marque and
Reprisal” power, and the power to make “Rules concerning Captures on Land
and Water.” Private violence not authorized by letters of marque or reprisal
could constitute piracy under the law of nations, making one clause in pari
materia with the other. And the “define and punish” clause is, in turn, preceded
by the Congressional power to “constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme
Court.”23 Together, these clauses provide a kind of cryptographic key to under-
standing the “declare War” clause and its brethren.
Taken as a whole, these clauses create a unified legislative scheme enabling
Congress to create mechanisms for the application and adjudication of the laws
of war and, where appropriate, to modify its effects. First, the Constitution
enables the Congress to create a judiciary capable of adjudicating the substantial
caseload that might flow from law of war cases, since the state militias and
privateers at sea are expected to form the first line of national defense. Next, the
scheme enables the Congress to prescribe precise rules governing “offences
against the law of nations,” including piratical private use of force, violations of
neutrality obligations, and violations of the laws of war by U.S. military
personnel when not otherwise privileged by the law of war. It then enables
Congress to make the determination of legislative fact that a state of war exists,
to “declare War,” thus enabling it to resolve legislatively judicial doubts as to
whether the legal rights and duties as provided in the laws of war attend for
public officers, and separately to enable private persons to benefit from immuni-
ties available under the law of war through “Letters of Marque and Reprisal.”
The scheme then allows Congress to control and further specify the scope of the
delegation of public authority to private persons to make war by enabling
Congress to “make Rules” further regulating such “Captures on Land and
War”—indeed, enabling Congress to vary from the default international law
20. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 20, at 22; see also Yoo, Constitutional Text, supra note 3,
at 1667–68.
21. STEPHEN C. NEFF, THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NEUTRALS: A GENERAL HISTORY 98 (2000).
22. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
23. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
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rules that would otherwise govern upon a declaration or letter of marque or
reprisal. In sum, because all the preceding and following clauses refer to
Congressional legislative power, the context makes clear that the power to
“declare” war is also a legislative power. Accordingly, the power to enact laws
that affect private rights and responsibilities can thus be adjudicated by the
tribunals of the United States. The effect of the power is to provide a determina-
tion that the powers of war that would otherwise flow from making war, such as
the power for agents of the executive to confiscate enemy or other property,
would be granted to the President.24
This reading must acknowledge the potential in theory for the domestic use
of war power to invade private rights without express congressional authoriza-
tion.25 But the law-constraining character of these clauses does not grant the
president anything more than the authority to exercise the powers made avail-
able by international law, subject to express congressional revision; and the
text immediately thereafter, as if in recognition of the possibility, provides the
Congress with the means to attenuate, if not eliminate, this danger. As Hamilton
argued in The Federalist, No. 69, Congress is granted the power to “raise and
support Armies,” albeit with the limitation that “no Appropriation of Money to
that Use shall be for a longer term than two Years,”26 a limitation that does
apply to the power to “provide and maintain a Navy.”27 The temporal limit on
appropriations for an Army, which can serve as a vehicle for the invasion of
private rights when war is declared, but failure to impose a temporal limitation
on the Navy, which plainly could not compel submission of a populace during
the Founding Era, suggests that the appropriations power in the text plainly
enables the Congress to address the danger of the domestic effects of plenary
Executive authority. Congress is given, in the next set of clauses, power to
“make Rules for the Regulation or the land and naval forces,”28 and to “call[]
forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union,”29 in order to further enable it
to prevent the military’s use for tyrannical domestic purposes. Thus, the normal
and natural reading of the whole text evidences a single design to enable the
Congress to constrain the President’s exercise of his Executive Power through
the Congress’s power to legislate and appropriate.
24. See Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. 110 (1812) (Justice Marshall, for the majority, and Justice
Story, dissenting, merely debating on the construction to be given to a Declaration of War as to the
extent to which Congress intended legislatively to confer such powers to the Executive Branch).
25. This danger is clearly at the heart of opposition to plenary presidential power. See, e.g.,
Youngstown Sheet & Tube C. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (addressing the domestic effects of the
unilateral assertion of Executive war-making authority in the largest and most sustained use of force in
U.S. history not authorized other than by congressional appropriations).
26. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 12.
27. Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
28. Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
29. Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (emphasis added).
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CONGRESS’S ROLE AND OTHER POTENTIAL MODERN LIMITS ON EXECUTIVE POWER
Practice confirms that the ex ante limitations of the War Powers Resolution
[the WPR] have been ineffective in regulating Presidential use of force.30
Indeed, the WPR has been viewed by the Executive Branch over the years as
unconstitutional or as even granting authority to the Executive to deploy U.S.
forces for limited periods even in the absence of congressional authorizations.31
As the text foreshadows, in modern practice, the appropriations power is the
means by which Congress can disable a President hell-bent on the use of force
in a manner inconsistent with the interests of the United States.32 In short,
current practice observes the patterns foreseen in the Constitutional text.
But in the absence of congressional conditions on the use of appropriate
funds, coupled with the absence of a Congressional Declaration or other statu-
tory authorization granting similar legislative authority for the President to do
what might otherwise be illegal, the question could arise whether the Presi-
dent’s use of force is cabined by international law as part of the law of the
United States. And so it has been argued.33 In the current context, one might
argue that the U.S.’s use of force against Syria for its use of chemical weapons
against its own people violated the U.N. Charter’s prohibition on any “use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,”34
without Security Council authorization under Chapter VII of the Charter or in
the exercise of the “inherent right of self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations.”35 If so, the question becomes whether
the President is empowered under his Article II powers to ignore that interna-
tional law or risk impeachment for doing so.
But this objection will also usually founder. Most recently, the Supreme
Court has made clear that the U.N. Charter is not self-executing domestic law
30. See, e.g., War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973), 50 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1551-46.
31. Sections 4(a) of the WPR presupposes Presidential authority, absent a declaration of war, to
introduce U.S. forces “into hostilities,” albeit under Section 5, only for limited periods without further
Congressional ratification and subject to override, which would seem to be unconstitutional given the
President’s plenary authority. In addition, Section 8(a) purports to establish a rule of interpretation
that would forbid later Congresses from repealing the WPR through implication, such as by appropria-
tions statutes that do not provide specific authorization. Plainly, if the Constitution contemplates the
exercise of Congressional authority by means of the ordinary use of appropriations statutes to regulate
Presidential use force, Section 8(a)’s attempt to alter the relevant constitutional standards for the
interpretations of congressional appropriations statutes is also unconstitutional, as arguably foreseen by
Section 8(d)(1) of the WPR, which provides that the WRP is not “intended to alter the Constitutional
authority of the Congress or of the President . . . .” Id.
32. See Richard F. Grimmett, Cong. Research Serv., RL33532, War Powers Resolution: Presidential
Compliance 13, 14 (2012), available at http:// www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33532.pdf.
33. See, e.g., Charles Lofgren, War-making under the Constitution: The Original Understanding,
81 YALE L. J. 672 (1972) (concerning the asserted illegality of the Vietnam War).
34. U.N. CHARTER, Art. 2(4).
35. Id., Arts. 41–42 and 51.
868 [Vol. 12:861THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY
under Article VI of the Constitution,36 even though the Constitution provides
that treaties are “the Supreme Law of the Land.”37 And, even if the UN
Charter’s prohibition, literally construed, barred U.S. action, it is in the nature
of international law that a treaty’s meaning may change in accordance with
changing circumstances and the parties’ subsequent practice, thus deviating
from its text.38 Moreover, the President is entitled to deference in treaty
interpretation as to the meaning of the U.N. Charter (or other potentially
applicable treaties), which further reduces the possibility of U.S. noncompliance
(albeit at the risk of establishing a precedent that a treaty means less than what it
appears to mean).39 And, although the question is highly debated and hyper-
technical,40 the President may well sometimes find it necessary to breach the
Charter (or some other treaty) when U.S. national security interests so require,
and accept international responsibility for breach of treaty, yet still take the
position that the remedy for that breach should come in the form of alternative
relief, such as compensation for damage done by the use of force, rather than
specific performance, meaning the cessation of hostilities.41
Insofar as the International Court of Justice has concluded that the U.N.
Charter’s Article 2(4) prohibition is now part of customary international law,42
if customary international law were to limit the President under the Supremacy
Clause, this theoretical possibility might impose a limit on the President’s duty
under his oath, and the “take Care” power, and his duty to “faithfully execute”
the laws and the Constitution of the United States.43 But the President could
safely rely on the fact that this proposition has never been fully established as a
matter of U.S. law. Moreover, the very nature of customary international law
requires the admission of the possibility that it can change through state
practice, and the exercise of Presidential authority to use force in the Syrian
case might be the paradigm case for the emergence of a humanitarian inter-
vention exception. Indeed, this rationale was asserted publicly by the
36. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
37. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
38. See VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, Art. 31(3)(b), May 22, 1969, entered into force
Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Although the U.S. is not party to the treaty, for reasons beyond the
scope of this essay, it is regularly cited in U.S. courts as the basis for treaty interpretation generally.
39. See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006) (consistent with Executive Branch
guidance, interpreting the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations not to require re-trial of a foreign
national death penalty prisoner initially denied consular access by U.S. state authorities).
40. See, e.g., JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES OF STATE RESPONSIBIL-
ITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 191–235 (2002) (discussing various modes of relief for
internationally wrongful acts).
41. See The Corfu Channel [U.K. v. Albania] (Assessment of Compensation), I.C.J. Reports 244
[1949] (awarding the U.K. monetary compensation for the destruction of British destroyers by Albanian
mines).
42. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua [Nicaragua. v. U.S.], (Merits),
I.C.J. 14 [1986] (deeming the U.N. Charter’s prohibition on the use of force to be part of customary
international law).
43. U.S. CONST., art. II, §§ 1, 3.
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United Kingdom as the basis for its determination that a limited use of force in
Syria would not have been unlawful.44 Thus, both under the Charter and
customary international law, it is no longer certain that a use of force pursuant
to the so-called “Responsibility to Protect” would have been internationally
unlawful, much less subject to sanctions.45
CONSTITUTIONAL DEFAULT RULES IN THE EVENT OF POLITICAL AND MORAL DOUBT
Finally, although beyond the scope of my legal argument, our debate raised
important questions about constitutional interpretation and its relation to pru-
dence, morality and self-government. What if the text were unclear? In the
absence of a clear textual answer, what should be the default position in
constitutional interpretation? The use of force is a serious matter. False posi-
tives, uses of force that are undesirable, must be weighed against the risk of
false negatives, failures to use force when use of force would be appropriate. A
position that requires advance congressional authorization for use of force
reduces false positives, but a position that favors executive discretion subject to
congressional override reduces false negatives. Moreover, the credible threat to
use force may in many cases obviate force itself. One famous Roman envoy
prevented a Syrian invasion of Egypt by quite literally drawing a “line in the
sand” and daring the Syrian King to cross that line at the price of war with
Rome.46 Thus, in the world in which we live today, given the emergence of
weapons of mass destruction, threats to United States that once seemed distant
have become fearfully immediate.
In the case of Syria, then, the tragedy of the President’s “red line” might not
be that the assertion of a “red line” was unconstitutional or imprudent, but
rather that the failure to carry through on the threat seriously damaged Ameri-
can credibility throughout the globe, inviting aggression by adversaries,47 and
44. See Chemical Weapon Use by Syrian Regime—UK Government Legal Position, available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/235098/Chemical-weapon-
use-by-Syrian-regime-UK-government-legal-position.pdf) (last visited June 9, 2014).
45. See Kenneth Anderson, Legality of Intervention in Syria in Response to Chemical Weapon
Attacks, ASIL Insights (Volume 17, Issue 21) (Aug. 30, 2013), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/
volume/17/issue/21/legality-intervention-syria-response-chemical-weapon-attacks (last visited June 9,
2014); see also Evan Perez, Obama looks to Congress to bolster legal case for Syria strike, CNN US,
Sept. 2, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/02/us/obama-syria-legal-issues/ (describing range of opin-
ion, including Executive Branch legal advice, that the President’s proposed course of action would not
violate international law) (last visited June 9, 2014).
46. See Roff Smith, Red Line, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC DAILY NEWS, Sept. 4, 2013, available at
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/09/130904-red-line-syria-obama-chemical-weapons-sarin-
gas/ (reporting Roman origins of the phrase in the confrontation between the Roman envoy Popillius
and the Seleucid King Antiochus IV).
47. See Leslie H. Gelb, Obama Must Show He’ll Use Military Means to Deter Russia in Ukraine,
THE DAILY BEAST, Mar. 30, 2014, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/03/30/obama-must-show-
he-ll-use-military-means-to-deter-russia-in-ukraine.html.
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undermining the confidence of allies,48 throughout the world. When the Presi-
dent is authorized to use force, false negatives can be minimized; when Con-
gress can employ its appropriations power to prohibit use of force, false
positives can be minimized. In either case, public justification for using force or
not using force should focus on considerations of prudence in the particular case
rather than institutional prerogative. While policy objections should never
masquerade as claims of unconstitutionality, it is necessary to recognize the
controlling facts that would argue for amending our Constitution to ensure that
the President has precisely the authority he or she needs in current circum-
stances to ensure the survival of the nation. As suggested by former Secretary
of State and Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, albeit in another context,
emergency does not create power but it does “furnish the occasion for its
exercise.”49
Yet, it was suggested during the Georgetown Symposium that the United
States, as an exceptional nation, should employ a default rule of pacifism, which
would be furthered by construing the “declare War” clause to disable the
President from acting, except in a narrow set of cases, without advance congres-
sional authorization. The argument drew from Plato’s justly famous account of
Socrates’s debate with Gorgias, a teacher of rhetoric—that one should prefer to
“suffer injustice” rather than “to do injustice.”50 But Gorgias, the rhetorician,
was the teacher of Meno, a family friend of Anytus,51 one of the three accusers
who ultimately brought Socrates to his death.52 Gorgias, Anytus and Athens
lived, but Socrates accepted suicide rather than defy the law and morals of
Athens. He avoided “returning” injustice with injustice.53
A free man or woman may choose to suffer injustice rather than do injustice,
but a political leader is responsible to a political community, and the morality
of individual choice is not as easily translatable, as some might think, to the
morality of collective action.54 Political leaders acting for the community may
not be free to impose martyrdom on those to whom they are politically
responsible. Quite possibly, the irony of Plato’s account is that Socrates himself
had something to learn from Gorgias and Anytus. In any event, the suggestion
that the U.S. Constitution requires political leaders acting for citizens to require
48. See Helene Cooper and Martin Fackler, U.S. Response to Crimea Worries Japan’s Leaders,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/06/world/asia/us-response-to-crimea-worries-
japanese-leaders.html?_r0.
49. See Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934).
50. See PLATO, GORGIAS, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO INCLUDING THE LETTERS 229, 251–2
paras. 469–70 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds. 1961) [THE DIALOGUES].
51. See PLATO, MENO, in THE DIALOGUES, supra at 353, 375, para. 90.
52. See PLATO, APOLOGY, in THE DIALOGUES, supra at 3, 9–10 para. 23.
53. See PLATO, CRITO, in THE DIALOGUES, supra at 27, 34, para. 49 (“So one ought not to return a
wrong or an injury to any person, whatever the provocation is.”).
54. See MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77
(G.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. 1946) (arguing that political decision-making requires following an
“ethic of responsibility” rather than an “ethic of ultimate ends”).
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those citizens to suffer, rather than commit injustice to protect such citizens,
raises complicated moral questions that cannot possibly have been answered in
the drafting and ratification of our Constitution. I would let the people decide;
otherwise, our Constitution truly might be a “ suicide pact.”55
55. See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 69 S. Ct. 894, 912, 937 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(“There is danger that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it
will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”).
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